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Wilson v. Goodrich was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could enforce a contract that was made in violation of a federal statute. The case involved a contract between the plaintiff, Wilson, and the defendant, Goodrich, for the sale of a steamboat. The contract was made in violation of the Steamboat Act of 1852, which prohibited the sale of steamboats without the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. The Supreme Court held that the state court could not enforce the contract because it was in violation of the federal statute. The Court reasoned that the federal statute was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, and that the state court could not enforce a contract that was in violation of a federal statute. The Court also noted that the federal statute was intended to protect the public from the dangers of unregulated steamboat sales, and that the state court could not undermine this purpose by enforcing the contract. The Court’s decision in Wilson v. Goodrich established the principle that state courts cannot enforce contracts that are in violation of federal statutes. This principle has been applied in numerous cases since then, and it remains an important part of the law today.
Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Wilson v. Goodrich, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that under California law, a contract for personal services could not be assigned to another party without consent from both parties involved in the original agreement. The plaintiff had contracted with an individual to perform certain labor on his land; however, when he failed to pay him as agreed upon, the defendant purchased this debt and attempted to collect it from him instead of paying out of pocket. Justice Field argued that since there was no evidence indicating either party consented to such an arrangement or assignment of rights between them, then it would have been illegal for any third-party creditor like Goodrich (the defendant) to step into their shoes and attempt collection on behalf of someone else who had already contracted with them directly. Therefore, he concluded that because there was no proof showing otherwise - i.e., consent by all parties involved - then Goodrich did not have a valid claim against Wilson (the plaintiff).