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In the case of Wilson v. Iseminger, 1901, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving land patents and their expiration dates. The plaintiff, Wilson, argued that he had acquired rights to certain lands under an Act passed by Congress in 1872 which granted pre-emption rights to settlers on public lands for five years after they were surveyed and opened for settlement. However, another Act was passed in 1891 which declared all unclaimed land patents expired if not claimed within seven years from when they were first made available. Wilson filed his claim more than seven years after the land became open but less than five years since he began settling it; hence falling foul of the new law but still within time according to old one. He sued Iseminger who had subsequently obtained patent over same piece of property arguing that application of newer law retroactively impaired his vested right under older statute. The court disagreed with Wilson's argument stating that there is no contract between government and settler until final proof has been accepted and certificate issued; thus no vested right existed at time newer act came into effect making it applicable without any constitutional violation.
In the dissenting opinion for Wilson v. Iseminger, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision violated a fundamental principle of justice by applying retroactively a statute of limitations to bar claims which were valid at the time they arose. He contended that when Congress enacted this law, it did not intend for it to apply retrospectively and thus extinguish existing rights without providing any alternative remedy or compensation. Furthermore, he asserted that even if Congress had intended such an application, it would be unconstitutional as it deprives individuals of their property without due process of law. In his view, once a right has been recognized and vested under existing laws, no subsequent legislation should be able to take away or impair that right unless there is clear legislative intent and provision made for just compensation or substitution.