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16-6855 WILSON V. SELLERS DECISION BELOW: 834 F.3d 1227 ORDER OF FEBRUARY 27, 2017: ADAM K. MORTARA OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. ORDER OF MARCH 27, 2017: INVITATION WITHDRAWN. ORDER OF DECEMBER 8, 2017: MARK E. OLIVE, OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA, IS APPOINTED TO SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER. CERT. GRANTED 2/27/2017 QUESTION PRESENTED: Did this Court's decision in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), silently abrogate the presumption set forth in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991)-that a federal court sitting in habeas proceedings should "look through" a summary state court ruling to review the last reasoned decision - as a slim majority of the en banc Eleventh Circuit held in this case, despite the agreement of both parties that the Ylst presumption should continue to apply? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 14-10681
In the case of Wilson v. Sellers, the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with determining how federal courts should consider state court rulings in habeas corpus cases when no clear reasoning is provided by the state court for its decision. The petitioner, Marion Wilson, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Georgia but claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective during sentencing proceedings. His claim was denied without explanation by a Georgia Superior Court and later rejected again by both the Georgia Supreme Court and Federal District Court on procedural grounds. The question before the U.S Supreme Court revolved around whether federal courts should “look through” an unexplained state-court decision to review what happened at earlier stages or if they must speculate as to why that higher-level court made its ruling without any stated reason. The majority opinion held that when a prisoner files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court after losing on direct appeal in State’s highest tribunal (or lower state tribunal), followed by denial of discretionary review from either one or both tribunals—the federal judge presiding over such case must presume (even though it does not appear anywhere within record) that unexplained decision rests upon same ground as lower-state-court's judgment unless rebutted convincingly.
In the dissenting opinion for Wilson v. Sellers, Justice Neil Gorsuch argued that federal courts should not be able to review state court decisions without clear evidence of an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law or a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. He contended that this approach would respect both Congress's intent in enacting habeas corpus laws and the principles of federalism by giving due deference to state courts' interpretations and applications of their own laws. Furthermore, he asserted that it is inappropriate for federal judges to speculate about what might have been left unsaid in a summary order from a state appellate court when there are other more plausible explanations available. Instead, they should focus on whether any reasonable jurist could agree with the final outcome reached by the state court system as a whole.