In the 1903 case of Winous Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Winous Point Shooting Club, a hunting organization based in Ohio. The dispute arose when John H. Caspersen claimed ownership over certain marshlands that were also claimed by the club for hunting purposes. The court had to determine whether these lands were part of Lake Erie and thus public property or if they could be privately owned as per Riparian rights (rights relating to water bodies). After examining historical maps and documents, it was determined that at one point these lands were indeed submerged under Lake Erie but had gradually become separated due to natural processes like sedimentation and vegetation growth over several decades. The court concluded that such naturally reclaimed land from a navigable lake becomes an extension of the adjoining riparian land and hence can be privately owned - thereby validating Winous Point Shooting Club's claim on this particular piece of marshland for their exclusive use.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Winous Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen argued that the majority's decision was incorrect because it failed to properly interpret Ohio state law regarding property rights and hunting privileges. The dissent contended that under Ohio law, a person who owns land bordering a body of water has exclusive fishing and hunting rights within their property boundaries extending into the water. Therefore, even though part of the marshland where duck shooting occurred was submerged underwater at high tide, it still fell within the boundary lines of Winous Point Shooting Club’s property as per their deed description. Thus, they should have exclusive hunting rights over this area regardless if it is covered by navigable waters or not during certain times due to tidal changes. The dissent also disagreed with how much weight was given to past practices in determining current legal interpretations; just because others had previously hunted on these lands without permission does not mean such actions were lawful or permissible under existing laws.