In the 1900 case of Wisconsin, Minnesota and Pacific Railroad v. Jacobson, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of Jacobson. The dispute arose when a railroad company refused to pay for land it had taken from Mr. Jacobson under eminent domain laws because they believed that he was not the legal owner at that time due to an ongoing foreclosure process on his mortgage by another party. However, during this period, no one else claimed ownership or possession rights over the property except for Mr.Jacobson who continued living there and paying taxes on it as usual despite his financial difficulties with his mortgage lender. The court held that since no other entity exercised its claim over the property during this period (including those involved in foreclosing), then Mr.Jacobson remained its de facto owner regardless of any pending litigation against him regarding his mortgage debt which did not involve third-party claims over title or possession rights to said property. Therefore, he was entitled to compensation from the railroad company for taking away what effectively still belonged to him legally until proven otherwise in a court of law through proper eviction proceedings initiated by whoever successfully proved their superior claim against him if any existed beyond mere allegations made without further action taken towards enforcing them into actual dispossession.

In the dissenting opinion for Wisconsin, Minnesota and Pacific Railroad v. Jacobson, 1900 case, it was argued that the majority's decision to allow a state legislature to alter or amend charters of corporations such as railroads without their consent is unconstitutional. The dissenting justices believed this violated the Contract Clause in Article I of the Constitution which prohibits states from passing any law impairing contractual obligations. They contended that when a corporation accepts a charter from a state legislature, it forms an inviolable contract between them with mutually agreed upon terms and conditions. Therefore, unilateral changes by one party (the state) would be inherently unfair and unlawful under constitutional principles protecting contracts rights. This view fundamentally disagreed with the majority’s interpretation allowing legislative interference in corporate charters on grounds of public interest or policy adjustments.