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01-1862 WOODFORD v. GARCEAU Ruling below: CA 9, 275 F.3d 769. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), this Court held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (28 U.S.C. § 2241, etseq.) did not apply to cases which commenced prior to the AEDPA ' s April 24, 1996, effective date. The circuits are split as to when a capital case commences for purposes of triggering the AEDPA. With one exception, all the circuits to consider the issue have found the AEDPA applies if the actual petition was filed on or after the AEDPA's effective date. However, in the Ninth Circuit, the AEDPA does not apply to a federal petition filed on or after April 24, 1996, if motions for appointment of counsel and stay of execution were filed before that date. Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc ). What is the correct trigger event for the application of the AEDPA in capital cases? 2. The Ninth Circuit applied a new rule of constitutional law to reverse the capital conviction in this case. The Ninth Circuit was indisputably on notice, from a source other than the prosecution, of the application of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), but did not address it. The failure to address Teague conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's holding that, even where Teague is not raised, it is an abuse of discretion not to consider it, absent a compelling, competing interest of justice. Jackson v. Johnson, 217 F.3d 360,361-63 (5th Cir. 2000). A. Did the Ninth Circuit abuse its discretion in failing to consider Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288? B. Since the Teague issue is properly raised in the petition for certiorari, and presents a threshold issue for this Court's determination, should the Ninth Circuit's reversal of Garceau' s capital conviction, based on the application of a new rule of constitutional law be vacated by this Court? CERT. GRANTED: 10/1/02 Limited to question 1 presented by the petition.
In the case of Jeanne Woodford, Warden v. Robert Frederick Garceau in 2002, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a federal law designed to speed up death penalty appeals did not apply if an inmate had already filed a habeas corpus petition before the law was enacted. The court held that Robert Frederick Garceau's appeal should be considered under older rules because he had begun his appeal process prior to enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996. This ruling clarified how courts should handle cases where inmates were mid-appeal when new laws took effect. It also highlighted that AEDPA’s stricter standards for granting relief would not apply retroactively.
In the dissenting opinion for Woodford v. Garceau, Justice Stevens argued that federal courts should be able to hear habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners even if they were not technically "in custody" under a state court judgment at the time their petition was filed. He believed that this interpretation of the law would better serve its purpose of protecting individuals' constitutional rights by providing them with an avenue to challenge unlawful detention. Furthermore, he criticized the majority's reliance on technicalities and procedural rules over substantive justice, stating that it undermined confidence in the judicial system and could lead to unjust outcomes.