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In the case of William W. Woodworth, Administrator &c., and E. V. Bunn, Assignee v James, Benjamin and Alpheus Wilson, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a contract made between two parties could be enforced against third-party beneficiaries who were not part of that agreement but had received some benefit from it. The original contract was for the sale of land owned by James Wilson to his brothers Benjamin and Alpheus; however William Woodworth later claimed he had purchased this same property from James in an earlier transaction which precluded him from selling it again to his brothers without first paying off Woodworth’s debt on the land. The Supreme Court ruled that since neither party mentioned any obligation or consideration owed to anyone else when they entered into their agreement, there was no legal basis for enforcing such a claim against them as third-party beneficiaries who had already taken possession of the property in question with full knowledge that another person may have held prior rights over it.
In the case of William W. Woodworth, Administrator, &c., and E. v. Bunn, Assignee, Complainants and Appellants v James, Benjamin and Alpheus Wilson (hereinafter referred to as “Wilson”), the dissenting opinion was that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Wilson on their counterclaim for damages against Woodworth et al for malicious prosecution. The majority had held that there could not be a recovery because it would amount to an action on the case which is prohibited by statute in Pennsylvania where this suit arose; however Justice Grier dissented from this holding arguing that such prohibition did not apply here since no special damage was alleged or proven but only general damages resulting from wrongful acts committed by Woodworth et al with malice aforethought towards Wilson's reputation and character as well as their business interests. Furthermore he argued that even if such prohibition applied then it should have been waived due to public policy considerations given the nature of these proceedings which were brought without probable cause or reasonable grounds for belief in its success thus constituting an abuse of process under common law principles applicable at time when this suit arose - 1846