Worthington v. Mason was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The case arose when the petitioner, Worthington, was convicted in a federal court for a crime committed in the state of Ohio. After his conviction, Worthington sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's decision. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for federal prisoners, and that the state court did not have the power to grant relief to a federal prisoner. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's decision. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for federal prisoners, and that the state court did not have the power to grant relief to a federal prisoner.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Worthington v. Mason, arguing that the majority had erred in their interpretation of a contract between two parties. The contract stated that one party would pay $10,000 for certain real estate and improvements made to it by another party. The majority held that this meant only those improvements which were completed before the date of execution of the deed should be paid for; however, Justice Field argued that this was not what was intended by either party when they entered into the agreement. He reasoned that since both parties knew there were still some unfinished improvements on the property at time of sale, they must have intended to include them as part of what would be paid for with consideration given to how much work remained and its value upon completion. Therefore he concluded that all reasonable expenses incurred in completing these works should also be included within what is owed under terms of said contract.