In the case of Ceasar Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation et al., 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether a general arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) could compel an individual to arbitrate his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim against his employer, rather than pursuing legal action in court. The plaintiff, Caesar Wright, was a longshoreman who suffered from back problems and claimed that he had been discriminated against due to his disability when he was not allowed to return to work after medical leave. The defendant company argued that under their CBA with the union representing Mr. Wright, all employment disputes were subject to mandatory arbitration. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Mr.Wright stating that although federal policy generally favors arbitration agreements as per Federal Arbitration Act(FAA), it does not extend this presumption for statutory claims unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence within the agreement itself or 'a well-defined and dominant' federal law mandates such procedure.The court found no explicit waiver of ADA rights nor any specific reference about compulsory arbitration for statutory antidiscrimination claims in their CBA.Hence,the general contractual language did not suffice for compelling employees into binding arbitrations over statutory rights.

In the dissenting opinion for the case of Ceasar Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation et al., Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, argued that the majority had misinterpreted Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA). They believed that this section did not prohibit courts from enforcing arbitration agreements in collective bargaining contracts. The dissenters contended that NLGA was designed to limit federal courts' ability to issue injunctions against labor disputes but it didn't explicitly ban enforcement of arbitration clauses in such cases. Furthermore, they pointed out that Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) promotes a strong policy favoring arbitration which should be respected unless Congress clearly states otherwise. In their view, there was no clear evidence indicating Congressional intent to preclude application of FAA's pro-arbitration principles on collective bargaining agreements under NLGA or any other statute.