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In the case of Yankaus v. Feltenstein et al., 1916, the United States Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over an insurance policy. The plaintiff, Yankaus, was a New York resident who held an insurance policy from a company incorporated in Connecticut but doing business in New York. The defendants were administrators of the estate of one Jacobson, also a New Yorker and insured by the same company under similar terms as Yankaus's policy. When Jacobson died without having paid his premium for that year (which was due on January 1), his administrators claimed that he had been granted credit until February 1 to pay it because he had always paid late before and never been penalized for it; therefore they argued that at his death on January 19th he still had coverage. The court ruled against them based on two main points: first, there was no written agreement granting such credit; secondly -and most importantly- even if there had been such agreement between insurer and insured allowing late payment without penalty or forfeiture of coverage this would have violated public policy since it could encourage people not to pay their premiums promptly which is detrimental to both insurers' financial stability and overall trustworthiness of insurance industry.
The dissenting opinion in the Yankaus v. Feltenstein case argued that the court majority had erred in its interpretation of New York's laws regarding fraudulent conveyances. The dissent maintained that these laws were intended to protect creditors from being defrauded by debtors who transferred their property to avoid paying debts, and not meant to be used as a tool for creditors to seize assets without due process. It was further contended that allowing such seizures violated both state law and constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The dissent also criticized the majority's reliance on an 1897 decision, arguing it was outdated and did not reflect changes in legal thinking or societal norms since then.