Young v. Bradley was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Young, was held in a federal prison in the state of Ohio. Young sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of the Constitution. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Young v. Bradley, arguing that the majority's decision was an unwarranted extension of a state's power to regulate commerce. He argued that while states have broad powers to protect their citizens from fraud and other forms of deception, they do not have the authority to interfere with contracts between individuals or corporations located in different states. In this case, he noted that both parties were residents of different states when they entered into their contract and thus it should be governed by federal law rather than state law. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that even if there had been some form of fraud involved in the transaction at issue here, it would still be up to Congress—not individual states—to decide how best to address such issues through legislation or regulation. Ultimately, he concluded by stating his belief that allowing each state to make its own rules regarding interstate commerce would lead only chaos and confusion for all concerned parties