Young v. Duvall and Another was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Young, was held in a federal prison in the state of Virginia. Young sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. The Court's decision in Young v. Duvall and Another established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and has been used to support the principle that state courts cannot interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Young v. Duvall and Another, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent. He argued that under prior decisions of the Supreme Court, a party who had been wrongfully dispossessed of land could not recover damages for rents or profits from another tenant unless he first regained possession of it by legal process. In this case, however, the plaintiff sought to recover such damages without having obtained possession through legal means; thus Justice Field concluded that his claim should have been dismissed on summary judgment as being barred by prior decisions of the court. Furthermore, he noted that even if there were some ambiguity in existing law regarding whether a party could seek recovery for rents and profits without regaining possession through legal process first, then any doubt should be resolved against allowing such recovery since it would create an incentive for tenants to remain unlawfully upon lands they did not own rather than risk losing their rights altogether if they left voluntarily before obtaining a judicial determination as to ownership.