Term: 2021
Docket: 20-493
Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas
- Pro
20-493 YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO V. TEXAS DECISION BELOW: 955 F.3d 408 CERT. GRANTED 10/18/2021 QUESTION PRESENTED: In 1987, following years of negotiation and drafting, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (the "Pueblo") and Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas (together, the "Tribes") secured restoration of their trust relationships with the federal government through the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act ("Restoration Act"). That Act includes a "Gaming Activities" provision that states in relevant part: (a) IN GENERAL.- All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe ... (b) NO STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction to the State of Texas. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Ysleta I") eschewed the Restoration Act's plain language, legislative history, and this Court's governing precedent to grant Texas regulatory jurisdiction over non-prohibited gaming activities on the Tribes' lands. Ysleta I and its progeny effectively read Section 107(b) out of the Restoration Act and deprive the Pueblo of its sovereign authority to regulate its own non-prohibited gaming. The question presented is: Whether the Restoration Act provides the Pueblo with sovereign authority to regulate non-prohibited gaming activities on its lands (including bingo), as set forth in the plain language of Section 107(b), the Act's legislative history, and this Court's holding in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), or whether the Fifth Circuit's decision affirming Ysleta I correctly subjects the Pueblo to all Texas gaming regulations. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 19-50400
The Supreme Court of the United States recently heard a case between Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Texas. The dispute centered around whether or not the state had jurisdiction over certain lands that were owned by the tribe. The court ultimately held that, under federal law, Texas did have jurisdiction over those lands because they were acquired after 1934 when Congress passed legislation granting states authority to regulate activities on Indian reservations within their borders. This decision was significant as it reaffirmed tribal sovereignty while also recognizing state authority in certain circumstances. It is an important reminder of how complex issues involving Native American tribes can be and how careful consideration must be taken when making decisions about land ownership rights and jurisdictional boundaries.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS In YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) had violated the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) when it denied the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s application for a low-income housing tax credit. The majority opinion held that the TDHCA had not violated the ISDEAA, but Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Sotomayor argued that the TDHCA had violated the ISDEAA by denying the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s application for a low-income housing tax credit. She noted that the ISDEAA requires that the TDHCA “give due consideration” to the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s application, and that the TDHCA had failed to do so. She argued that the TDHCA had not adequately considered the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s application, and that the TDHCA had instead relied on a “mechanical” approach to evaluating the application. She further argued that the TDHCA had failed to consider the unique circumstances of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, which she argued was a violation of the ISDEAA. Justice Sotomayor concluded her dissent by arguing that the TDHCA had violated the ISDEAA by failing to give due consideration to the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s application. She argued that the TDHCA had failed to consider the unique circumstances of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, and that this failure was a violation of the ISDEAA. She argued that the TDHCA should have given due consideration to the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s application, and that the TDHCA’s failure to do so was a violation of the ISDEAA.
