In the case of Jacob Zedner v. United States, 2005, Zedner was charged with attempting to defraud banks by presenting them with billions of dollars in false financial instruments. He signed a waiver that excluded "all time" from his Speedy Trial Act calculation which aimed at delaying his trial indefinitely. The district court accepted this waiver and subsequently dismissed an indictment against him for violating the Speedy Trial Act's requirement that a defendant be tried within 70 non-excludable days after being charged or appearing before a judicial officer, whichever is later. Zedner appealed on grounds that the dismissal violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act because it allowed for indefinite delay of trial proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Zedner stating that such waivers are not permissible as they contradict public interests outlined in the act itself - maintaining speedy trials to minimize pretrial detention and protect defendants' constitutional right to a speedy trial while ensuring fair administration of justice.

In the dissenting opinion for Jacob Zedner v. United States, Justice Breyer argued that the majority's interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act was too rigid and failed to consider practical realities. He contended that a defendant should be able to waive his rights under this act in order to allow more time for preparation or negotiation. According to him, such flexibility would not undermine the purpose of ensuring speedy trials but rather accommodate individual circumstances without compromising justice. Furthermore, he disagreed with invalidating waivers because it could lead to unnecessary dismissals where delays were caused by defendants themselves. In essence, Justice Breyer believed that courts should have discretion in applying this law based on specific case conditions instead of strictly adhering to its literal terms.