In the case of Breard v. Alexandria, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of a city ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation without prior consent from homeowners. The plaintiff, George C. Breard, was a salesman for a magazine subscription company who had been arrested and fined multiple times under this ordinance while trying to sell subscriptions door-to-door in Alexandria, Louisiana. He argued that his First Amendment rights were being violated by the law as it interfered with his ability to communicate freely with potential customers. The court disagreed with Breard's argument stating that although freedom of speech is protected under the Constitution, it does not grant an absolute right to press one’s message upon others without regard for their personal privacy rights or societal interests such as public safety and residential tranquility which are also important considerations within constitutional framework. Therefore, they upheld the validity of local laws regulating commercial transactions like these when they serve significant government interests beyond merely controlling nuisance activities.

In the dissenting opinion for Breard v. Alexandria, Justice Frankfurter argued that the majority's decision failed to properly consider the balance between individual rights and societal interests. He contended that while it is important to protect an individual’s right to distribute literature as a form of free speech, there must also be consideration for maintaining order within communities and protecting citizens from unwanted intrusions in their homes. In his view, door-to-door solicitation can often feel invasive or disruptive to homeowners who have not invited such interaction. Therefore, he believed local governments should have some authority in regulating these activities through permit systems or other means without infringing upon First Amendment rights. He expressed concern that by striking down Alexandria's ordinance requiring permits for door-to-door salesmen entirely rather than modifying it or suggesting less restrictive alternatives, the court was tipping too far towards protecting individual liberties at expense of community peace and privacy.