In Corbin v. County of Black Hawk, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a county could be held liable for damages caused by a defective bridge. The plaintiff, Corbin, was injured when his wagon fell through a bridge that had been built by the county. Corbin argued that the county was liable for his injuries because the bridge was defective and the county had failed to maintain it. The Supreme Court held that the county was liable for Corbin's injuries. The Court reasoned that the county had a duty to maintain the bridge in a safe condition and that it had breached that duty by failing to do so. The Court also held that the county was liable for Corbin's damages even though the county had not been negligent in constructing the bridge. The Court reasoned that the county had a duty to maintain the bridge and that it had breached that duty by failing to do so. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the county was liable for Corbin's injuries because it had a duty to maintain the bridge in a safe condition and had breached that duty by failing to do so. The Court also held that the county was liable for Corbin's damages even though the county had not been negligent in constructing the bridge.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Corbin v. County of Black Hawk, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both precedent and sound public policy. He argued that a county is not liable for damages caused by its officers or agents unless it has authorized them to act on its behalf, which had not been established in this case. Furthermore, he noted that there were no allegations of negligence against the county itself; rather, any liability would be based solely on respondeat superior principles - i.e., vicarious liability for an employee's actions - which could not be applied here because there was no evidence showing that the individual defendants acted as agents of the county when they committed their alleged wrongs. Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting that if counties were held responsible for all acts done within their boundaries regardless of whether they authorized those acts or even knew about them beforehand, then "the burden imposed upon [them] would become intolerable."