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08-1498 HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT DECISION BELOW: 552 F.3d 916 CONSOLIDATED WITH 09-89 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT CERT. GRANTED 9/30/2009 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(l), which prohibits the knowing provision of "any * * * service, * * * training, [or] expert advice or assistance," 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(l), to a designated foreign terrorist organization, is unconstitutionally vague. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-56753, 05-56846
The U.S. Supreme Court case Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al., 2009 revolved around the interpretation of a federal law that prohibited providing material support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations. The Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) argued that this prohibition violated their First Amendment rights as they sought to provide non-violent dispute resolution and human rights advocacy training to such groups in order to promote peaceful resolutions and respect for international law among these entities. However, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government with a 6-3 decision stating that even seemingly benign assistance could help legitimize terror groups and free up other resources within those organizations for violent activities; thus it was not protected by the First Amendment's freedom of speech clause under these circumstances. This ruling upheld key provisions of anti-terrorism legislation allowing prosecution for indirect support of terrorism while also setting important legal precedent regarding limitations on free speech when national security is at stake.
In the dissenting opinion for Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al., Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, argued that the majority's interpretation of "material support" was overly broad and could potentially infringe upon First Amendment rights to free speech and association. They contended that peaceful assistance aimed at promoting lawful activities should not be considered as material support to terrorist organizations just because these groups might also engage in illegal activities. The dissenters believed that this broad interpretation could criminalize a wide range of legitimate interactions with such groups including teaching them about human rights or helping them negotiate peace agreements - actions which are fundamentally different from providing weapons or other direct forms of aid used for terrorism.