In Humiston v. Wood, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a contract between two parties was valid and enforceable. The contract in question was between a landowner, Humiston, and a tenant, Wood. Humiston had leased a portion of his land to Wood for a period of five years. The contract stated that Wood was to pay Humiston a certain amount of money each year for the use of the land. The Supreme Court held that the contract was valid and enforceable. The Court noted that the contract was clear and unambiguous, and that both parties had agreed to its terms. The Court also noted that the contract was supported by consideration, meaning that both parties had given something of value in exchange for the contract. The Court concluded that the contract was valid and enforceable, and that Humiston was entitled to the payments specified in the contract.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Humiston v. Wood, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that under prior decisions of this Court, a party who had been wrongfully dispossessed of land could recover damages for rents and profits from those who had unlawfully taken possession of it. The majority held otherwise, ruling that such recovery was not available because there were no specific words in the deed conveying title which provided for such compensation. Justice Field disagreed with this conclusion on two grounds: firstly, he argued that when parties enter into a contract they are presumed to have intended all legal consequences flowing from it; secondly, he noted that even if there were no express terms providing for rent or profit recovery in the deed itself then other evidence should be considered as well - including parol evidence - so long as it did not contradict any written provisions contained therein. In sum, Justice Field concluded by asserting his belief that allowing recovery of rents and profits was consistent with both existing law and justice itself; thus making him unable to agree with the majority's decision denying relief on these grounds.