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In Lee v. Madigan, Warden (1958), the U.S Supreme Court considered whether a state prisoner could challenge his detention in federal court without first exhausting all available state remedies. The petitioner, Robert E. Lee, was convicted of murder by an Illinois jury and sentenced to 99 years imprisonment. He filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court claiming that he had been denied due process because the trial judge refused to allow him to cross-examine one of the prosecution's witnesses about prior inconsistent statements made during police interrogation. The District Court dismissed his petition on grounds that he hadn't exhausted all available state remedies as required under Section 2254 of Title 28 United States Code - which mandates exhaustion before seeking relief at Federal level unless there is absence or ineffectiveness of such State corrective processes or circumstances rendering them ineffective. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed this decision stating that since Illinois law did not provide any remedy for petitioner’s constitutional claim; it would be futile requiring him to pursue further proceedings within State courts thus making exception from general rule applicable.
In the dissenting opinion for Lee v. Madigan, it was argued that the majority's decision to grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner who had not exhausted all his available remedies in state court undermined federalism principles and disrupted comity between states and federal courts. The dissenting justices believed that the petitioner should have been required to seek redress through Illinois' post-conviction hearing process before turning to federal courts. They also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of due process rights, arguing that there was no constitutional violation because both parties had an equal opportunity at trial to argue whether certain evidence should be admitted or excluded. Furthermore, they contended that any error made by the trial judge did not necessarily result in an unfair trial as long as it did not significantly affect its outcome.