In the case of Samuel Massey and Others v. Joseph L. Papin, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a contract between two parties could be enforced when it had been made without consideration or any other form of legal obligation. The plaintiffs argued that they had entered into an agreement with Papin in which he agreed to pay them for certain services rendered but then refused to do so after they completed their work. The defendants countered that since there was no consideration given by either party, the contract should not be enforced as it lacked any legal standing under common law principles. After considering both sides’ arguments, the court ultimately ruled in favor of Massey and his co-plaintiffs, finding that even though there may have been no consideration exchanged at the time of making this agreement, its enforcement would still serve justice due to its moral obligations on behalf of all involved parties. This decision set a precedent for future cases involving contracts lacking formal considerations or binding agreements; if one party has already performed their part according to an oral promise from another individual who refuses payment afterwards, then courts can enforce such agreements based on fairness rather than strict adherence to common law principles alone

In the dissenting opinion of Samuel Massey and Others v. Joseph L. Papin, Justice Curtis argued that the court should have reversed the judgment of the lower court in favor of Papin because it was based on an erroneous interpretation of a contract between them. He believed that under Missouri law, which governed this case, there were two distinct contracts at issue: one for payment to Massey and his associates for their services as surveyors; and another for compensation from Papin to those same individuals if he chose to purchase certain land they had surveyed. The majority opinion held that these two agreements constituted only one contract with no separate consideration or obligations associated with each agreement; however, Justice Curtis disagreed strongly with this conclusion since both parties clearly intended them to be separate contracts when they entered into negotiations over them. Furthermore, he argued that even if these agreements were considered part of a single contract by Missouri law, then all conditions precedent must still be met before any obligation could arise out of it - including payment from Papin upon purchasing the land - which did not occur here due to his failure to make such payments after acquiring title in 1854-1855 as required by their original agreement.