In the 1950 case Moore, Administratrix v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. The plaintiff, Mrs. Moore, filed a lawsuit against the railway company for negligence after her husband was killed while working as a brakeman on one of their trains. She claimed that he had been ordered to ride on top of a boxcar without proper safety measures in place and fell to his death as a result. However, evidence showed that it was common practice for employees to ride atop cars and there were no specific regulations prohibiting this at the time of Mr. Moore's accident. The court held that under Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), an employer is not liable if they could not have foreseen harm resulting from their actions or omissions based on ordinary human experience; thus ruling out negligence by default because riding atop train cars was considered normal procedure during those times with no prior incidents reported. Therefore, despite Mrs.Moore’s claim about lack of safety precautions leading to her husband's death,the court found insufficient proof showing any breach in duty by Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., hence dismissing her claims.

In the dissenting opinion for Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., Justice Frankfurter argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings and failed to consider important aspects of federal law. He contended that the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) should not be interpreted as broadly as it had been by his colleagues, arguing instead for a narrower interpretation based on legislative intent and precedent. In particular, he disagreed with their conclusion that an employee could sue under FELA even if they were not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury or death. Furthermore, he criticized them for failing to adequately address whether or not Congress intended FELA to apply in such circumstances when drafting it. Ultimately, Justice Frankfurter believed this case represented a departure from established principles of statutory interpretation and expressed concern about its potential implications.