Walston v. Nevin was a Supreme Court case decided in 1871. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a piece of land in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, William Walston, had entered into a contract with the defendant, John Nevin, to purchase a piece of land for $1,000. Walston paid the full amount, but Nevin refused to convey the deed to the land. Walston then sued Nevin for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that Nevin was liable for breach of contract and ordered him to convey the deed to Walston. The Court reasoned that the contract was valid and binding, and that Nevin had no legal justification for refusing to convey the deed. The Court also held that Walston was entitled to damages for the breach of contract, and ordered Nevin to pay him $1,000 plus interest. The decision in Walston v. Nevin established the principle that a contract is binding and enforceable, and that a party who breaches a contract is liable for damages. This case is still cited today as an example of the importance of upholding contracts and enforcing their terms.

In the Supreme Court case of Walston v. Nevin, Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision was wrongfully based on an overly narrow interpretation of the law and did not take into account all relevant facts or evidence presented by both parties. He noted that while there may have been some technical errors made by Mr. Walston in his filing for bankruptcy, these mistakes were minor and should not be used to deny him relief from debtors' prison as they had no bearing on whether or not he would be able to pay off his debts if given more time to do so. Furthermore, Justice Douglas argued that it was unfair for Mr. Walston to suffer imprisonment when other debtors who committed similar errors were allowed leniency due to their financial circumstances at the time of filing for bankruptcy protection; this double standard violated basic principles of justice and fairness under our legal system, according to Justice Douglas’s dissent opinion in this case