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02-271 DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY v. STEPHENSON Ruling below: CA 2, 273 F.3d 249. QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Whether absent class members are precluded from relitigating the issue of adequacy of representation through a collateral attack on a class settlement, after class members had a full opportunity to opt out, object, and appeal, and after both the trial court and the court of appeals, in the course of approving the settlement, expressly determined that the class representatives adequately represented the entire class. 2. Whether, if collateral attack is permissible, the "adequacy of representation" issue is properly determined as of the time of the original litigation or in light of events and changes in the law occurring years after the settlement has become final and all of the settlement proceeds have been disbursed. CERT. GRANTED: 11/4/02 J. Stevens took no part.
The U.S. Supreme Court case Dow Chemical Company, et al. v. Daniel Raymond Stephenson et al., 2002, revolved around the issue of whether a settlement agreement in a class-action lawsuit over Agent Orange exposure during the Vietnam War was fair to all claimants involved and if it precluded future lawsuits from those who later developed health problems related to their exposure. The plaintiffs were veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and subsequently developed serious health issues; they argued that they should be allowed to sue for damages because their illnesses did not manifest until after the original settlement agreement was reached in 1984. However, Dow Chemical Company and other manufacturers of Agent Orange contended that the previous settlement covered all potential claims related to Agent Orange exposure, including those that might arise in the future due to latent diseases caused by such exposure.
In the dissenting opinion for Dow Chemical Company v. Daniel Raymond Stephenson, Justice Ginsburg argued that the settlement agreement in a class action lawsuit related to Agent Orange exposure was unfair and inadequate. She noted that many of those affected by Agent Orange were not adequately represented or compensated under the original 1984 settlement due to lack of knowledge about their potential claims at that time. Furthermore, she disagreed with the majority's view on res judicata (a matter already judged), arguing it should not be applied rigidly in this case given its exceptional circumstances - specifically, new scientific evidence linking Agent Orange exposure to certain diseases which emerged after the initial settlement. Thus, she believed these claimants should have been allowed an opportunity to pursue their legal rights separately from the original class action suit.