Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indiana v. Talevski

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 2 May 2022

  1. Since the high-water mark in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), this Court has consistently rebuffed efforts to find privately enforceable rights in Spending Clause statutes. Indeed, several Justices have suggested that the entire project of enforcing such rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is mistaken: Spending Clause statutes are "much in the nature of a contract," Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), and when Section 1983 was enacted, contracts in general-and contracts with governmental entities in particular-did not give rise to claims by third-party beneficiaries. The Seventh Circuit's decision below illustrates just how flawed this project is. Notwithstanding the Court's instructions to the contrary, see Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981), and Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289 n.7 (2002), the court of appeals relied on the appearance of the word "right" several times in the Federal Nursing Home Amendments Act of 1987 ("FNHRA") to hold that patients may use Section 1983 to second-guess garden-variety transfer and medication decisions-thereby federalizing much medical-malpractice litigation and nullifying important state medical-malpractice rules. This case presents the following questions:
  2. Whether, in light of compelling historical evidence to the contrary, the Court should reexamine its holding that Spending Clause legislation gives rise to privately enforceable rights under Section 1983.
  3. Whether, assuming Spending Clause statutes ever give rise to private rights enforceable via Section 1983, FNHRA's transfer and medication rules do so

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

The dispute was whether nursing home residents can use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce two rights described in the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act, one involving freedom from unnecessary chemical restraints and one involving limits on transfer or discharge. Justice Jackson wrote for the Court that they can. The Court said § 1983 applies to federal laws as written, without excluding Spending Clause statutes. It also held that the FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create individual rights because they are phrased in rights-creating, resident-focused terms. Finally, the Court found no indication that Congress meant to block § 1983 suits, since the FNHRA’s administrative enforcement scheme does not conflict with private enforcement. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment below.

Dissent summary

Etalia.ai summary of the dissenting opinions

Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Alito in part, and wrote separately to argue that spending-power legislation like the FNHRA does not “secure” rights by law for purposes of § 1983. He said such statutes are more like contractual offers and that treating them as enforceable laws creates a constitutional problem. Justice Alito also dissented and argued that although the FNHRA creates individual rights, its remedial scheme forecloses § 1983 relief. He said the Act’s enforcement structure is comprehensive enough to show Congress did not intend private § 1983 actions.

Opinion written by Justice Jackson

Decided 8 Jun 2023 · Official report

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Oral argument transcript

Argued 8 Nov 2022

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