Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 25 Apr 2022

''Nearly 80 years removed from International Shoe, it seems corporations continue to receive special jurisdictional protections in the name of the Constitution. Less clear is why." Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1038 (2021) (Gorsuch J., concurring). This petition seeks resolution of an issue that has divided courts around the country. More than a dozen state supreme courts and every federal court of appeals have weighed in on the question with conflicting results. An unbroken line of this Court's cases holds that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction with a party's consent. Corporations enforce that precedent to the letter in their contracts of adhesion, requiring flesh and blood consumers to litigate disputes with businesses in often-distant tribunals. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Turnabout should be fair play (and is, incidentally, consistent with substantial justice). Consistent with that rule, states have enacted laws requiring corporations operating within their boundaries to consent to personal jurisdiction when they register to do business in those states. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found such a statute unconstitutional under this Court's decision in International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny. That erroneous result is but the latest decision among dozens that are squarely divided on the question presented: Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business in the state

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

The case concerned whether Pennsylvania could require an out-of-state corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction as a condition of registering to do business there, and then allow a suit on any claim against that corporation. Robert Mallory sued Norfolk Southern in Pennsylvania under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, but Norfolk Southern argued that due process barred the suit because the company was incorporated and headquartered elsewhere and the claim did not arise in Pennsylvania. The Court vacated and remanded. Justice Gorsuch wrote that Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. controls: longstanding consent-by-registration statutes can satisfy due process, and Norfolk Southern had registered in Pennsylvania and accepted the burden of being sued there on any claim. The Court said lower courts must follow that precedent unless and until this Court overrules it.

Dissent summary

Etalia.ai summary of the dissenting opinions

Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Kavanaugh, dissented. The dissent argued that Pennsylvania Fire should not control because later personal jurisdiction decisions have limited general jurisdiction over corporations and should be read to foreclose jurisdiction based only on registration. It viewed Pennsylvania’s scheme as inconsistent with modern due process doctrine and warned that the Court’s ruling would let States evade the limits on general jurisdiction by conditioning business registration on consent to suit. The dissent said this would disrupt the Court’s more recent framework for corporate jurisdiction and would make specific jurisdiction unnecessary for corporations.

Opinion written by Justice Gorsuch

Decided 27 Jun 2023 · Official report

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Oral argument transcript

Argued 8 Nov 2022

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